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LA PLATA ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION V. CUMMINS. A
RADICAL DEPARTURE OR A CONSISTENT
INTERPRETATION OF PRE-EXISTING EQUITIES
IN COLORADO CONDEMNATION LAW?
INTRODUCTION
The transformation of Colorado into a permanent home for mil-
lions of people has not left the wild frontiers of the past unscathed. In
fact, the developing communities' constant demands for electricity,
transportation and water inevitably create legal turbulence in areas that
were previously untouched by modern development. Compensating
property owners for the arduous transitions inherent in modernization
is a complex task.
On November 10, 1986, the Supreme Court of Colorado decided
three cases which explicate many problems faced by property owners
and their adversaries, the condemning authorities. ' All three cases-the
leading case being La Plata Electric Association v. Cummins 2 -involved
property owners who had portions of their land condemned by electrical
companies as easements for the construction of power lines. 3 The prop-
erty owners sought compensation for the diminution in value of the re-
mainder of their properties resulting from the unsightliness of a power
line,4 loss of view 5 and aesthetic damage. 6 This comment first describes
the existing law in the majority and minority jurisdictions with respect to
compensation for the diminution in value of the remainder of property
taken in eminent domain. Next, it analyzes the development of condem-
nation case law in Colorado. Finally, this comment analyzes the impact
the La Plata decision will have on Colorado law.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Origins of the Dispute
In order to understand the cases involving the unsightliness of elec-
trical power lines and the loss or impairment of view, it is helpful to
discuss general concepts with regard to condemnation. In eminent do-
main proceedings, real property is conveniently divided into two catego-
1. See La Plata Elec. Ass'n v. Cummins, 728 P.2d 696 (Colo. 1986); Bement v. Empire
Elec. Ass'n, 728 P.2d 706 (Colo. 1986); Herring v. Platte River Auth., 728 P.2d 709 (Colo.
1986).
2. 728 P.2d 696 (Colo. 1986).
3. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 697; Bement, 728 P.2d at 707; Herring, 728 P.2d at 710. In
these cases, the condemning authorities developed the respective properties to improve
electrical services to the communities.
4. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 697.
5. Bement, 728 P.2d at 706.
6. Herring, 728 P.2d at 709 (involved the construction of electrical power lines and an
electrical substation).
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ries. 7 One category consists of takings that condemn entire parcels of
property. The measure of damages in this category is the value of the
condemned parcel of property at the time of the actual taking.8 This
established standard of recovery is consistent with the United States and
Colorado Constitutions which mandate just compensation for takings of
real property.
9
The second category of eminent domain proceedings consists of
property that is partially taken. Partial takings frequently occur as a re-
sult of the government's continuing struggle to accommodate the
changes inherent in developing communities. Just compensation for
partial takings is judicially determined in two ways. One test courts use
to determine just compensation is the "before and after" rule.' 0 This
rule measures damages by determining the difference between the value
of the whole property immediately before the taking and the value of the
remaining property immediately afterward." The second test courts
use in partial takings is often referred to as the "modified before and
after" rule.12 This rule requires compensation to property owners for
the fair market value 13 of the land taken and for the damages to the
remainder of the property. 14 Although the majority of courts allow
compensation for property owners in accordance with the "before and
after" rule, some courts do not allow compensation for consequential
damages. 15
La Plata, Bement and Herring firmly establish that Colorado follows
the majority rule with respect to valuation of property taken. These de-
cisions allow parties to present evidence and to recover damages for the
diminution in value to their remaining property caused by the installa-
7. Goldstein & Goldstein, Aesthetic Damages and Loss of View, 197 N.Y.L.J., May 20,
1987, at 1, col. 1.
8. Id. at 2.
9. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V provides: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation."; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15 provides: "Private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation."; see
also Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304 (1923) (stated that the
property owner is to be indemnified fully, as if property had not been taken); Mononga-
hela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893) (determined thatjust com-
pensation includes the full and perfect monetary equivalent of the property taken).
10. See, e.g., Pierpont Inn, Inc. v. State, 70 Cal. 2d 282, 449 P.2d 737, 74 Cal. Rptr.
521 (1969) (permitted the jury to consider loss of view and beach access as factors in
determining severance damages).
11. Id. at 746, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 530. See generally Annotation, Eminent Domain: Compen-
sability of Loss of View From Owner's Property - State Cases, 25 A.L.R.4th 671 (1973) [hereinafter
Annotation, Eminent Domain].
12. G. SCHMUTZ, CONDEMNATION APPRAISAL HANDBOOK 97, 98 (1963) [hereinafter
SCHMu-rz].
13. The "fair market value" is the highest price at which a seller can sell property to a
willing buyer in the open market. It is assumed that the buyer and seller are acting freely
and exercising reasonable judgment. Little v. Burleigh County, 82 N.W.2d 603, 608 (N.D.
1957).
14. SCHMUTZ, supra note 12, at 97.
15. See generally Annotation, Eminent Domain, supra note 11, at 689-93. "Consequential
damages" are damages to the remaining property arising from injuries caused by the con-
struction of public improvements. United Power Ass'n v. Heley, 277 N.W.2d 262, 265
(N.D. 1979).
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tion and maintenance of electrical power lines. In order to properly an-
alyze these cases, it is helpful to review the law in the jurisdictions which
allow recovery for consequential damages.
B. The Majority View Regarding Compensation for the Remainder
The evaluation of several cases reveals that the primary issue in em-
inent domain proceedings is whether property owners are entitled to
compensation for a diminution in value to the remainder of their prop-
erty. In a partial taking, the majority of jurisdictions compensate prop-
erty owners for the damage to the remainder of their property resulting
from the improvement. 16 This general rule is not limited to cases in-
volving utility companies that condemn private property for the con-
struction of power lines; instead, this rule applies to a variety of partial
taking scenarios. 
17
Generally, there are three important arguments in favor of permit-
ting the trier of fact to consider elements affecting the remainder of
property, such as impairment of view, beach access and freedom from
noise, in order to determine just compensation. The first argument con-
tends that these elements, although not compensable per se under the
definition of property, 18 directly affect the property's fair market value,
loss of which is compensable. 19 Therefore, elements that increase or
decrease the value of the property must be considered in order to accu-
rately determine the extent of compensation the property owner is enti-
tled to recover. 20 Some courts hold that every factor affecting the value
of the property must be evaluated to properly satisfy the requirement of
just compensation.
2i
The second line of reasoning in favor of permitting the trier of fact
to consider elements affecting the remainder is based on the presump-
tion that factors such as loss of view, unsightliness and aesthetic dam-
ages are bona fide elements of damage requiring compensation. 22 The
basis for this argument is not that these elements are unpleasant to
property owners; instead, the grounds for requiring compensation di-
16. See, e.g., Dennison v. State, 22 N.Y.2d 409, 411-13, 239 N.E.2d 708, 709-11, 293
N.Y.S.2d 68, 69-71 (1968) (reasoning that loss of privacy and seclusion, and impairment of
view, resulting from the construction of a highway are factors that determine consequent-
ial damages to the remainder).
17. E.g., Campbell v. United States, 226 U.S. 368 (1924) (land condemned by the
United States was used as a site for a plant that produced nitrates); United States v.
760.807 Acres of Land, 731 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1984) (land taken for the construction of a
safe harbor which was used to load and unload explosives).
18. See generally Bockrath, Aesthetics and Condemnation Awards: Problems in Preserving the
Aesthetic Environment Through Eminent Domain, 7 NAT. RESOURCES LAw. 621, 621-31 (1974).
19. Ohio Pub. Serv. Co. v. Dehring, 34 Ohio St. 532, 533, 172 N.E. 448, 449 (1929).
20. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Hesselden Inv. Co., 84 N.M. 424, 426, 504
P.2d 634, 636 (1972) (all elements affecting the fair market value should be considered,
even though some of the damages are not guaranteed property rights).
21. Keinz v. State, 2 A.D.2d 415, 156 N.Y.S.2d 505, appeal denied, 3 A.D.2d 815, 161
N.Y.S.2d 604 (1956).
22. See, e.g., Illinois Iowa Power Co. v. Rein, 369 I1. 584, 596, 17 N.E.2d 582, 588
(1938); Board of Trade Tel. Co. v. Darst, 192 Ill. 47, 61 N.E. 398 (1901).
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rectly result from the potentially adverse effect these elements have on
potential buyers. 23 In short, the construction of an easement that is dis-
tasteful to a prospective buyer diminishes the market value of the prop-
erty and, therefore, requires compensation. 24 This argument stems
from the constitutional requirement that a reduction in value should not
be borne by the owner whose property was taken for a public purpose
without his consent.
2 5
The final argument states that a sovereign power should be re-
quired to fully indemnify a property owner for proximate and conse-
quential damages flowing from an act in condemnation. 2 6 The exercise
of eminent domain is based upon the theory that, while the taking of
property may greatly inconvenience the property owner, the resulting
improvements promote the welfare of the general public. 2 7 Therefore,
there is no reason why an individual property owner whose land is taken
in invitum28 should suffer financial loss that may be prevented by the
condemning authorities' award of proximate and consequential
damages.
29
The dilemma of determining diminution in value to the remainder
appears before the courts as an evidentiary issue. The condemnor bears
the burden of proving the value of the land taken and the owner bears
the burden of proving damage to the remainder.3 0 In the majority of
jurisdictions when a partial taking occurs, a landowner is not required to
show any peculiar damages to his property that are not suffered by the
community at large. 3 ' Instead, the landowner must prove that his land
was damaged as a direct result of the taking.
32
The value of the property taken, as well as the effect of the construc-
tion and maintenance of the improvement, are elements frequently
presented to the trier of fact by witnesses attempting to assist in deter-
mining the extent of damages. 33 The majority of courts hold that if a
property owner's view is partially obstructed by the construction of a
public improvement which effectively impairs the view, forcing the
viewer to look across a newly constructed improvement, the property
owner is entitled to compensation.
34
23. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Westervelt, 67 Ill. 2d 207, 210, 367 N.E.2d 661, 663
(1977).
24. Id.
25. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
26. South Buffalo Ry. Co. v. Kirkover, 176 N.Y. 301, 303, 68 N.E. 366, 368 (1903).
27. Id. at 302, 68 N.E.2d at 368.
28. "In invitum" is a term applied to a proceeding against an unwilling party. BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 704 (5th ed. 1979).
29. South Buffalo, 176 N.Y. at 302, 68 N.E.2d at 368.
30. Department of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Bloomer, 28 Ill. 2d 267, 271, 191 N.E.2d
245, 248 (1963).
31. See generally 4 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 14.01-.02 (J. Sackman
Rev. 3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter 4 P. NICHOLS].
32. City of Crookston v. Erickson, 244 Minn. 321, 325, 69 N.W.2d 909, 912 (1955).
33. Missouri Power & Light Co. v. Creed, 32 S.W.2d 783, 787 (Mo. App. 1930) (the
court held that witnesses must present evidence concerning the damages incurred from
the taking of the property, which is not purely remote, speculative or conjectural).
34. Purchase Hills Realty Assocs. v. State, 35 A.D.2d 78, 312 N.Y.S.2d 934, 937, aff'd,
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C. The Minority View
The minority decisions, which do not allow compensation, are
based on three arguments. The first argument generally states that
every element of consequential damages in an eminent domain proceed-
ing should not be considered by the trier of fact. The minority stresses
that a property owner is not entitled to compensation for consequential
damages resulting from an interference with an interest shared in com-
mon with the general public. In order to justify compensation, the
property owner must establish that the injury is special or peculiar to the
property; if the damage differs only in degree from that suffered by the
general public, it is not compensable. 3 5 Therefore, when an abutting
landowner shares the same impairment, a property owner is not entitled
to recover merely because a part of his property was needed to construct
the improvement.
3 6
The second argument states that there are certain inconveniences
which property owners must endure without monetary compensation.
3 7
The basis for this argument is that individual landowners must bear the
burden of modernization in order to promote the general welfare of de-
veloping communities. 38 Similarly, any rights a landowner possesses to
land abutting a public improvement are subordinate to the public right
to enjoy the improvement.
3 9
Lastly, the minority contends that courts should not consider ele-
ments such as aesthetic damage and unsightliness in fixing condemna-
tion awards to the owner of the remaining land.40 The minority reasons
that factors affecting compensable damages necessarily involve physical
disturbances of property rights. Subsequently, remote, speculative and
uncertain elements do not afford a basis for the allowance of damages,
4 1
but simply reflect the particular grievance of the landowner.
42
30 N.Y.2d 615, 282 N.E.2d 127, 331 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1970) (construction of a highway that
separated the remainder from a golf course entitled the property owner to recover conse-
quential damages, despite the fact that the golf course could still be seen from the
remainder).
35. Dennison v. State, 22 N.Y.2d 409, 411, 239 N.E.2d 708, 710, 293 N.Y.S.2d 68, 73
(1968); see generally 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 202 (1966).
36. See generally Covey, Frontage Roads: To Compensate or Not to Compensate, 56 NW. U.L.
REv. 587 (1961).
37. See, e.g., Bopp v. State, 19 N.Y.2d 368, 373, 227 N.E.2d 37, 40, 280 N.Y.S.2d 135,
139 (1967).
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., State ex rel. Schiederer v. Preston, 170 Ohio St. 542, 546, 166 N.E.2d 748,
752 (1960) (raising grade of abutting street promoted the health, safety and welfare of the
community); State Highway Comm'r v. Easley, 215 Va. 197, 202, 207 S.E.2d 870, 875
(1974) (the landowner's right of access to a public road was condemned pursuant to an
exercise of state's police power to regulate the flow of traffic).
40. Illinois Power & Light Corp. v. Barnett, 338 Il1. 499, 501, 170 N.E. 717, 719
(1930).
41. Illinois Power Co. v. Wieland, 324 Ill. 411, 155 N.E. 272 (1927).
42. Illinois Power & Light Corp. v. Peterson, 322 11. 342, 153 N.E. 577, 579 (1926).
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D. Colorado Case Law
In the landmark case of Lavelle v. Town ofJulesburg,4 3 the Colorado
Supreme Court established that a property owner cannot be compen-
sated for damages shared by the general public. 44 In Lavelle, an owner
of three contiguous lots was denied compensation for noise, smoke, va-
pors and increased fire hazards resulting from the condemnation of an
adjacent lot which was used as a means of ingress and egress to the land-
owner's property. The court held that the owner of condemned prop-
erty is entitled to recover damages to the remainder only if the property
owner can prove that the damages suffered were peculiar to the land.
4 5
Accordingly, the court denied recovery since the property owner could
not prove that he incurred special damages because the landowner's
damages were suffered by the general public.
46
The pertinent question raised in Farmers' Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v.
Cooper4 7 was whether the decrease in the fair cash market value of the
remainder resulted from the construction and operation of a canal. The
court stated that the interference with the property owner's use of water
necessarily depreciated the market value of the property; consequently,
the petitioner must be compensated to the extent of the interference. 48
In Cooper, the compensable damages were not awarded for the decrease
in value of the water appropriated, but were awarded as a result of the
canal which depreciated the value of the landowner's property by de-
priving the landowner of the use of his water. 49 The court held that in
condemnation proceedings, damages - present and prospective - that
are the natural, necessary or reasonable incident of a taking must be
assessed.
50
In a 1947 condemnation proceeding in which land was taken for
highway construction, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed an in-
struction which required just compensation for private property taken
for public purposes. 5' The court stated in Noble that the property owner
was entitled to recover the value of land taken as well as the damages to
the remainder. 52 The court also stated that in order to determine the
real value of the land and the damages to the remainder, men of ordi-
nary prudence and judgment must not only consider the present condi-
tion of the property, but also any future, reasonable use of such
property.
53
In Mack v. Board of County Commissioners,54 the court reaffirmed the
43. 49 Colo. 290, 112 P. 774 (1911).
44. Id. at 300-01, 112 P. at 778.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 54 Colo. 402, 130 P. 1004 (1913).
48. Id. at 407, 130 P. at 1006.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Board of County Comm'rs v. Noble, 117 Colo. 77, 79, 184 P.2d 142, 143 (1947).
52. Id. at 79, 184 P.2d at 144.
53. Id.
54. 152 Colo. 300, 381 P.2d 987 (1963).
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test used in Colorado to determine if property has been damaged. 5 5
This test measures the diminution in value of the remainder by compar-
ing the fair market value of the remainder of the property before and
after the actual taking. 56 Furthermore, the court stated that all natural,
necessary and reasonable damages resulting from the taking which affect
the market value of the remainder should be considered.
5 7
The first case in Colorado specifically dealing with impairment of
view as a basis for awarding compensable damages was Troiano v. Colo-
rado Department of Highways.5 8 In Troiano, the landowner sought damages
for a highway viaduct constructed adjacent to her established motel.
The landowner argued that the newly constructed structure ruined the
eye appeal of the land and the land's affinity with the roadway, resulting
in the diminution in value of the property. 59 Despite these pleas, the
court, adhering to legal precedent, applied the "different in kind" test,
60
and determined that the property owner's loss of view was damnum ab-
sque injuria,
6 1 and therefore not compensable.
6 2
The court's reasoning was based on the "different in kind" test first
enunciated in City of Denver v. Bayer.6 3 According to this test, annoyance
or inconvenience suffered by the general public is not a compensable
property interest; rather, in order to constitute recoverable damages, a
property owner must establish that the damage was peculiar to his prop-
erty.6 4 In ruling that the operation of a business, such as a motel, does
not satisfy the requirements of the "different in kind" test, the court in
Troiano concluded that there was no rationale in the law for holding that
the mere presence of a structure requires compensation.
6 5
In State Department of Highways v. Davis,6 6 the state condemned a nar-
row strip of land to construct a service road for a highway. The salient
issues considered in Davis were the value of the property taken and the
extent of damages to the remainder resulting from the impairment of
55. Id. at 304, 381 P.2d at 990. See also Fenlon v. Western Light & Power Co., 74
Colo. 521, 223 P. 48 (1924); Wassenich v. Denver, 67 Colo. 456, 186 P. 533 (1919).
56. Mack, 152 Colo. at 302, 381 P.2d at 989.
57. Id.
58. 170 Colo. 484, 463 P.2d 448 (1969).
59. Troiano, 170 Colo. at 501, 463 P.2d at 448.
60. Id.
61. "Damnum absque injuria" is a loss which does not give one an action against the
person who caused such loss. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 354 (5th ed. 1979).
62. Troiano, 170 Colo. at 501, 463 P.2d at 455. See also Earl v. Arkansas State High-
way Comm'n, 241 Ark. 11, 405 S.W.2d 931 (1966); Blair v. State, 19 A.D.2d 937, 244
N.Y.S.2d 274 (1963); State ex. rel. Schiederer v. Preston, 170 Ohio St. 542, 166 N.E.2d 748
(1960). According to these authorities, loss of light, air and ventilation constitutes general
damages and not specific damages. See Campbell v. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n, 183
Ark. 780, 38 S.W.2d 753 (1931); Probasco v. City of Reno, 459 P.2d 772 (Nev. 1969);
Baldwin-Hall Co. v. State, 22 A.D.2d 747, 253 N.Y.S.2d 651 (1964).
63. 7 Colo. 113, 118, 2 P. 6, 9 (1883); see also Gilbert v. Greeley, Salt Lake & Pac. Ry.
Co., 13 Colo. 501, 508-09, 22 P. 814, 816 (1889); Hayes v. City of Loveland, 651 P.2d 446,
448 (Colo. App. 1982).
64. Bayer, 7 Colo. at 118, 2 P. at 9.
65. Troiano, 170 Colo. at 501, 463 P.2d at 448.
66. 626 P.2d 661 (Colo. 1981), rev g 42 Colo. App. 250, 596 P.2d 400 (1979).
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access to the highway system. 6 7 The importance of this decision lies in
the supreme court's holding that an abutting property owner is entitled
to compensation only when a limitation or loss of access substantially
interferes with his means of ingress and egress to and from his prop-
erty.6 8 The Davis court stated that the inconvenience caused by the use
of a more circuitous route to gain access to his property does not consti-
tute a substantial interference, since mere circuity in route is identical -
or possibly only differs in degree - to the inconvenience suffered by the
general public.
69
II. LA PLATA ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION V. CUMMINS
A. Facts
On May 19, 1981, La Plata Electric Association ("La Plata") filed a
petition in condemnation. 70 La Plata sought a fifty foot wide easement
through the middle of a 19.533 acre parcel of land owned by Buckley D.
and Laquita J. Wagner. The Wagner's land is located near the City of
Durango and commands a view of the city and the surrounding
mountains.
On July 14, 1981, the district court granted La Plata the use and
possession of .853 acres of land owned by the Wagners for the construc-
tion of an electric transmission line. 7 1 On June 7, 1982, the district
court entered an order appointing a Board of Commissioners to deter-
mine the amount of compensation the Wagners would receive for their
property. 7 2 At a hearing held by the commissioners, both parties stated
that the highest and best use 73 of the Wagner's property was for future
development. The parties, however, presented polar evidence regard-
ing the value of the remainder of the Wagners' property.
La Plata's appraiser testified that the construction of the power line
caused no damage to the remainder of the property.74 Buckley D. Wag-
ner and two appraisers testified that the value of the remaining property
was significantly reduced as a result of the unattractiveness of the power
lines and the impairment of view. 7 5 La Plata's objection to the admis-
sion of evidence, regarding the diminution of value caused by the loss of
view and aesthetic damage, was based on the theory that these causes
are not compensable according to Lavelle, Troiano and Davis.76 La Plata's
objection was denied by the district court.
67. Davis, 626 P.2d at 663.
68. Id. at 664.
69. Id. at 664-65.




73. United States v. 760.807 Acres of Land, 731 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1984); seegenerally
4 P. NICHOLS, supra note 33, at § 12.02[3].
74. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 697.
75. Id.
76. Id. See supra notes 44-47, 59-70 and accompanying text.
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The district court, in accordance with the findings of the Board of
Commissioners, entered a judgment stating that the value of the prop-
erty taken was $4,844 and the damages to the remainder of the property
was $5,000. 7 7 The trial court distinguished previous Colorado case law
on the ground that the contemplated use of the Wagner's property spe-
cifically and uniquely affects the remainder of the property. The power
line nearly bisected the Wagner's property, and the ensuing unattrac-
tiveness and loss of view did not generally affect any other landowner or
the general public. Therefore, the trial court held that evidence con-
cerning the adverse effect on the market value of the remainder, result-
ing from the installation and maintenance of a power line, was
admissible.
78
On February 16, 1983, La Plata submitted to the Colorado Court of
Appeals a Notice of Appeal. La Plata's appeal was based solely on the
award of compensation for injury to the remainder of the Wagner's
property. On January 3, 1985, the court of appeals affirmed the ruling
of the district court.
79
Nevertheless, the court of appeals addressed the problem of
whether a property owner is entitled to compensation from a different
perspective. The court applied the "general damage/special damage"
distinction and determined that the reduction in value of the remainder
of the property, resulting from the erection of the power line, consti-
tuted special damages.8 0 Consequently, the court allowed compensa-
tion for loss of view and aesthetic damages directly resulting from the
public improvement which adversely affected the value of the remain-
der.8 1 The court of appeals held that in order to require compensation,
the special nature of the damages must be supported by evidence that
the diminution in the remainder's market value was caused by the
improvement.
8 2
B. The Holding of the Supreme Court of Colorado
La Plata filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari which the Supreme
Court of the State of Colorado granted. Persuaded by the lower courts,
the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of ap-
peals. Justice Lohr, stating the majority's opinion, held that a property
owner is entitled to recover all damages that are the natural, necessary
and reasonable result of the taking, measured by the reduction in the
market value of the remainder of the property. 8 3 Furthermore, the
court held that a landowner may present any relevant evidence concern-
77. Id. See generally CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-1-105(1)-(2) (1982 & Supp. 1985) (grants
statutory authority for the court to appoint a board of commissioners.)
78. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 697.
79. La Plata Elec. Ass'n v. Cummins, 703 P.2d 592 (Colo. App. 1985).
80. Id. at 594.
81. Id. See, e.g., Union Elec. Co. v. Simpson, 371 S.W.2d 673, 681 (Mo. App. 1963).
82. La Plata, 703 P.2d at 594.
83. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 696, 700.
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ing the diminution of the land's market value caused by the taking.84
Finally, the supreme court stated that the lower courts did not err in
allowing evidence regarding the aesthetic damage and loss of view that
caused a diminution in value of the Wagner's property. 85 In short, the
court held that a property owner is entitled to present evidence and re-
ceive compensation for all damages to the value of the remainder result-
ing from a partial taking of real property.
8 6
Although the supreme court held in accordance with the lower
courts, it did not follow the lower courts' reasoning. Instead, the court
determined that the "general damage/special damage" distinction ap-
plied by the court of appeals had no validity in La Plata.8 7 The supreme
court applied the concept currently used in the majority ofjurisdictions,
simply, that a property owner suffering a diminution in value to his re-
maining property must be compensated. 8 8 The supreme court also
based its holding on the principles of fairness and economic reality.
8 9
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Rovira, joined by Justices Erickson and Vollack, wrote the
dissenting opinion which criticized the majority's holding for creating
additional problems rather than solving the existing obstacles regarding
compensation to the remainder.9 0 The dissent reasoned that the major-
ity incorrectly departed from the requirement that compensable damage
to a property owner must be "different in kind" from the injuries suf-
fered by the general public.9 1 According to the minority, La Plata incor-
rectly overrules Lavelle because the majority held that the "different in
kind" test set out in Lavelle is not applicable when the diminution in
property value results from a partial taking. 9 2 The dissent argued that
overruling Lavelle is inconsistent with the general rule that a property
owner is not entitled to recover damages for impairments which are suf-
fered by the general public and differ only in extent or degree.9 3 Fur-
thermore, the dissent contended that the "different in kind" criteria is
established in Colorado case law, 9 4 and the factual distinction in La Plata
does not constitute an adequate reason to overrule this test.
95
The dissent also voiced their displeasure with the majority's excep-
84. Id. at 703.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 700.
88. Id. See, e.g., Kamo Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Cushard, 455 S.W.2d 513, 515-16 (Mo.
1970).
89. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 701. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
90. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 706 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 703 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
92. Id. (Rovira, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 704 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 703 (Rovira, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Hayutin v. Colorado State Dep't of
Highways, 175 Colo. 83, 89, 485 P.2d 896, 899 (1971) (traveling a circuitous route is the
kind of inconvenience that is merely different in degree, not in kind, from that sustained by
the general public and, as such, is not compensable).
95. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 703 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
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tion to the "general damage/special damage" distinction. This test
states that an individual property owner must establish that the damage
incurred to his property is peculiar or special to his property; as a result,
it requires compensation that the general public is not entitled to re-
cover.9 6 The rationale behind the dissent's argument is that abolishing
the "general damage/special damage" distinction is inconsistent with
the Davis holding.
The dissent argued that the majority based their decision on the
fact that the majority of jurisdictions require compensation when the
land which is taken causes a diminution in value to the remainder. The
dissent concluded that, although the majority of jurisdictions does not
employ the "general damage/special damage" distinction, the construc-
tion of an electrical power line easement does not entitle property own-
ers to recover compensation for partial takings. Instead, the dissent
contended that the holdings in Davis and Lavelle are controlling in a La
Plata scenario.
97
The dissent also based their argument on a different interpretation
of the fairness doctrine. According to the dissent, the majority arbitrar-
ily singled out "lucky" property owners to receive compensation.9 8 The
dissent believed that if the damage suffered by the property owner is the
same type that the public suffers, a property owner should not be com-
pensated simply because a portion of his property was condemned. 99
The dissent argued that it is inequitable to reward one property owner
simply because a portion of his land was taken when another property
owner, who does not have land taken and suffers from the identical in-
fringement, receives no compensation. 100
Furthermore, the dissent contended that the majority's decision de-
parted from the initial premise that the public should shoulder the costs
of improvements. Finally, the dissent pointed out that the majority's
holding, which required compensation for damages that are natural,
necessary and reasonable, imposed a difficult standard. The dissent ex-
plained that the majority erred in not precisely defining the application
and contours of this standard; as a result, it created uncertainty for the
trial courts in determining the boundaries of such a broad proposal.101
III. ANALYSIS
In La Plata, the Supreme Court of Colorado faced the difficult task
of determining whether a property owner is entitled to compensation
for damages and diminution in value of the remainder of real property
directly resulting from a partial taking. Extrapolating important issues
raised by the majority opinion enables the reader to wade through the
96. Id. at 704 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 705 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
98. Id. (Rovira, J., dissenting).
99. Id. (Rovira, J., dissenting).
100. Id. (Rovira, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 706 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
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labyrinth of confusion and to focus on why the majority reversed Colo-
rado case law and held that property owners must be compensated. By
analyzing specific arguments raised by the majority, distinguishing ex-
isting case law in Colorado and evaluating substantive arguments raised
by the dissent, the importance of this decision radiates through the con-
fusion and explicates the precise meaning and scope of the La Plata deci-
sion. Such an analysis not only explains why the court ruled correctly,
but also explains the difficulty in understanding the opinion.
A. Requiring Compensation For Damage To The Remainder
Two determinative arguments in La Plata which demand considera-
tion are lost within the opinion. The first argument is hidden in the
shadows of both the "fairness" and "economic reality" theories es-
poused by the court.10 2 The court addressed the problem of determin-
ing whether a diminution in value occurred by comparing a condemning
authority to a private person who is acquiring or selling a parcel of
land.' 0 3 The majority stressed that a person who is contemplating the
selling price of a portion of real property necessarily adjusts the price to
include the value of the land actually taken as well as the diminution in
value of the remainder. 10 4 The court reasoned that a condemning au-
thority should be subject to the same burdens and benefits as a private
party; therefore, the condemning authority's liability should be the
equivalent of a private party's liability in the theoretical marketplace.'
0 5
An important result of the holding is that it puts reins on the con-
demning authorities' expansive power. The requirement of monetary
compensation forces condemning authorities to evaluate the most prac-
tical placement of improvements and to provide property owners, who
are unable to resist the partial takings, some relief. The concept of bri-
dling the condemning authorities' discretion is one way to ensure that
the transitions of modernization occur smoothly. Without a require-
ment for compensation, the condemning authorities have a license to
further their goals with whimsical and selfish decisions that leave prop-
erty owners with diminutions in value of their property and no
redress. 106
The second argument that demands consideration involves the spe-
cific criteria that serve as a condition precedent for an award of compen-
sation in partial taking cases. The Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and the Colorado Constitution unquestionably pro-
vide the foundation for requiring compensation in eminent domain pro-
ceedings. 10 7 Nevertheless, just compensation cannot be required
102. Id. at 701.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. See generally Groy, The Colorado Supreme Court Redefines Compensable Damages in
Condemnation Action, 16 COLO. LAW. 1829, 1830 (1987).
106. Brief for Appellees at 10, La Plata Elec. Ass'n v. Cummins, 728 P.2d 696 (Colo.
1986) (No. 85-82).
107. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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merely on a constitutional basis. The holding of La Plata mandates that
the elements required to bring cases within the realm of allowing com-
pensation are a partial taking and a diminution in value of the remain-
der. 10 8 The majority's holding is difficult to understand because the
reasoning used to arrive at their decision is not precisely stated. In fact,
the majority's opinion is congested with extraneous material that over-
shadows the holding. 10 9 The confusion created in La Plata could have
been prevented and the holding could have been more forceful had the
majority explicitly stated the effect previous Colorado decisions had on
La Plata and limited its analysis to a comprehensive explanation of how
La Plata both overrules and accepts prior case law. It is essential to un-
derstand that the La Plata decision only applies to fact patterns involving
a partial taking combined with a diminution in value of the remainder.
B. Distinguishing Existing Colorado Case Law
Had the Supreme Court of Colorado classified all partial takings
into one category, the precedent established by prior Colorado cases of
denying compensation would have been applied in La Plata. The court,
however, recognized that denying compensation to property owners suf-
fering a diminution in value of the remainder is an undesirable result,
since it is contrary to consitutional requirements and to the notion of
fairness. Therefore, when analyzing the majority's distinction of prior
case law, it is important to consider the negative impact these cases
could have if applied to a La Plata scenario.
The first Colorado decision that requires consideration is Lavelle v.
Town ofJulesburg, i10 which held that a property owner could not be com-
pensated for damages to the remainder for annoyance and inconven-
ience suffered by the general public. "'1 The Lavelle court stated that if
damage to the remainder is to some right or interest solely affecting the
property owner then the owner is entitled to compensation as if the re-
maining property had been actually taken. 1 12 La Plata overruled Lavelle,
holding that the "general damage/specific damage" test is no longer
controlling in partial taking controversies. Overturning any case creates
turbulence in the courts; however, the holding in La Plata is more com-
patible with the notions of growth and progress. Harnessing the power
of condemning authorities and deciding who should bear the financial
burden of progress are modern issues the courts are forced to handle.
In La Plata, the court reevaluated the necessity of maintaining the "gen-
108. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 703.
109. Undefinable phrases, such as "adverse aesthetic impact" and "aesthetic dam-
ages," hinder the reader's ability to understand the majority's confusing opinion. Further-
more, the majority erroneously focused their analysis on Colorado case law which proved
to be factually distinguishable from the instant case and, as a result, complicated the deci-
sion and retracted significance from the holding.
110. 49 Colo. 290, 112 P. 774 (1911).
I 11. Lavelle at 300, 112 P. at 778. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
112. Lavelle at 300-01, 112 P. at 778.
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eral damage/specific damage" test and determined that the test must be
altered to reflect the changes inherent in modern improvements.
The most pertinent argument raised by the dissent is the incompati-
bility of the supreme court's ruling in State Department of Highways v. Davis
with the majority's holding in La Plata. The Davis court sets forth two
rules which appear to make Davis irreconcilable with La Plata. First, the
Davis court stated that "whether or not property is actually taken is im-
material to the issue of damages to the remainder of property for loss or
limitation of access." ' "1 3 If compensation was required for loss of view
when there has not been a taking, any person with a view of an improve-
ment would have a right to a lawsuit. This notion is clearly incompatible
with our present legal system. Secondly, the Davis court only required
compensation when the remainder has been damaged by a substantial
limitation or loss of access. 1 4 The court reasoned that any other result
would create serious problems of fairness to the landowners similarly
situated since the inconvenience suffered by the landowner is identical
in kind to that suffered by the general public.
If, at first glance, one were to interpret the rules enunciated in Davis
as controlling in a La Plata scenario, a landowner would not be compen-
sated for a diminution in value to the remainder if the same injury was
suffered by the common public. However, the crux of the issue is not
whether the Davis holding is controlling in all eminent domain cases;
instead, the primary concern is how to factually distinguish the two cases
in order to preserve each individual holding. One of the most important
distinctions between Davis and La Plata is that in Davis, which dealt with
access to the landowner's property, the diminution in value of the re-
mainder was not a direct result of a taking."15 The Davis court held that
there was no compensable damage since the damage incurred to the
landowner did not substantially interfere with his means of access to the
highway, but merely inconvenienced the landowner's former prime ac-
cess. 116 Conversely, in La Plata, the partial taking was directly upon the
property itself; therefore, it diminished the value of the remainder.
This argument, however, does not adequately explain the underly-
ing distinctions between the two cases. Another critical distinction is
that Davis is strictly a police action;' 17 whereas, La Plata is an electrical
power company taking a portion of property to construct an electrical
power line. In La Plata, a significant property right is taken as a result of
a condemning authority taking a portion of a landowner's property.
Whether this right is ambiguously labeled as a loss or impairment of
113. State Dep't of Highways v. Davis, 626 P.2d 661, 665 (Colo. 1981). See supra notes
66-69 and accompanying text.
114. Davis, 626 P.2d at 665.
115. In Davis, the claim of damage was based on the loss of prime highway frontage
property; although the landowners retained two direct points of access onto the frontage
road, the taking forced the landowners to travel an additional 300 feet to gain access to the
highway.
116. Davis, 626 P.2d at 666.
117. Id. at 664 (the court stated that a property owner's right of access to and from land
abutting a highway may be reasonably regulated for the public safety or welfare).
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view or aesthetic damage, the crucial point is that a property owner is
being denied the right to control the use of his property., 18
Similarly, Troiano v. Colorado Department of Highways 119 is distinguish-
able from La Plata. Although Troiano and La Plata appear to be similar
because of the alleged loss of aesthetic view, it is important to recognize
that in Troiano, unlike La Plata, the taking did not occur on the land-
owner's property. 120 Since the situation in Troiano does not satisfy the
first requirement of a partial taking set forth in La Plata, the Troiano deci-
sion is clearly distinguishable from La Plata.
C. Evaluating Substantive Arguments Raised By The Dissent
1. Setting Aside the Different In Kind Test
In order to appreciate the significance of La Plata, it is essential to
analyze the dissent's arguments and the dissent's inability to focus their
criticism on the key elements of the majority's decision. The dissent ar-
gued that the "different in kind" test 121 should have been applied to La
Plata. 122 In light of the previous discussion regarding the exact holding
of La Plata,123 it is more practical to determine the issue of compensa-
tion on whether there was a taking, rather than basing compensation on
the degree of damages suffered on the property owner's land.i
24
Furthermore, the dissent criticized the majority's statement that re-
coverable damages are "the natural, necessary and reasonable result of
the taking."' 2 5 The dissent apparently felt that this statement was am-
biguous and was not supportive of the holding in La Plata. This criti-
cism is hypocritical because the dissent's reliance on the "different in
kind" test appears equally ambiguous and lacks precise definition.
126
2. The General Damage/Special Damage Test
The dissent, grasping for something concrete with which to rebut
the majority's opinion, argued that the majority failed to abide by the
"general damage/special damage" test. 12 7 The dissent reasoned that
rejecting the test resulted in an arbitrary distinction between landown-
ers who have had portions of their property condemned, and therefore
compensated for their injury, and landowners who have not had por-
tions of their property condemned, and therefore not compensated even
though they suffer the identical injury. However, the dissent was unable
118. La Phta, 728 P.2d at 701 n.4.
119. 463 P.2d 448 (Colo. 1970). See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
122. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 703 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
123. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
124. See Brief for Appellees at 9, La Plata Elec. Ass'n v. Cummins, 703 P.2d 592 (Colo.
App. 1985) (No. 85-82).
125. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 700.
126. See Brief for Appellees at 7, La Plata Elec. Ass'n v. Cummins, 703 P.2d 592 (Colo.
App. 1985) (No. 85-82).
127. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 703 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
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to challenge the majority's opinion with sound legal arguments because
the distinction between special and general damages is arguably as arbi-
trary as the formulation adopted in La Plata.
3. Fairness Arguments
The majority and the dissent partially based their decisions on their
own notions of what constitutes a fair result. However, the majority's
version commands the most attention because compensation is required
when a property owner's right to determine the fate of his property is
lost through condemnation. 12 8 Conversely, the dissent's version - a
property owner, suffering a diminution in value of the remainder of his
property from a partial taking, is not entitled to compensation since an
adjacent property owner, who is suffering from the same type of dam-
age, is not entitled to compensation - is not forceful because it merely
appeals to one's emotions and lacks legal authority.129
V. CONCLUSION
The La Plata decision enables the Colorado courts to make a defini-
tive statement on how the law should be applied in partial taking pro-
ceedings which result in the diminution in value of the remainder.
Although the court ruled correctly, this creative opinion was far from
clear, due to the majority's failure to precisely explain how the court
reached its holding. As a result, the dissent was unable to comprehend
the opinion and to accurately rebut the reasoning behind the holding.
Nevertheless, this confusion and lack of clarity does not mar this deci-
sion which provides for the longevity of private property' 3 0 by limiting
the power of the condemning authorities.
David A. Shore
128. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 701 n.4.
129. Id. at 703 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 703 (Rovira,J., dissenting).
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